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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NONA W. WATSON

*

Plaintiff and Appellant

*

vs.

*

NORMAN A. WATSON

*

Case No. 14 652

Defendant and Respondent *
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent seeks to affirm the judgment and decision of
the District Court of Cache County, State of Utah.
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant-Respondent shall be referred to herein as the
Defendant and the Plaintiff-Appellant shall be referred to herein
as the Plaintiff*
The Defendant concurs generally with the statement of facts by
the Plaintiff.

However, several additional facts may be stated

to advise the Court of those facts in the Defendant's favor.
The parties in this action were married for approximately
32 years.

During this period of time, it would appear that there

were serious disagreements betv/een the parties and separations at
various times.

The parties both indicated that the property ac-

quired presently was as a result of joint efforts between the oarDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2ties during the course of their marriage.
However, during the course of their marriage, the Defendant has
conveyed property to the Plaintiff for the purpose of effectuating
reconciliations.
This was true with the hone in Rexburg which was used for the
down payment on the home in Logan.
With respect to the bank accounts of the parties, it appears
that the Plaintiff in her statement of facts, states that she has
a bank account which is her property and that they have a joint bank
account which is jointly owned property and therefore, she alleges
that what is in her name is hers and what is in the joint name
is half hers and what is in her husband's name alone and in his possession is also half hers.

Such a statement is not uncommonly made

by a wife in a divorce proceeding.

However, the background facts

indicate that the Defendant was employed in Shiprock, New Mexico
as a teacher and has an income of approximately $18,000.00 per year
and that Plaintiff is also a teacher and has been employed over the
past 14-1/2 years as a teacher and was employed at the time of this
trial by Box Slder High School at an annual salary of $14,400.00
per year.

She claims disability.

However, the transcript indi-

cates that she still has a potential income pending termination of
her disability and so it would appear that from a fair reading of
the transcript, both of the parties can be gainfully employed, both
of the parties have contributed to the funds held by the parties
whether the funds are held in one namt= or jointly held and the judgment of the Court
was based upon these facts* Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3The Court also heard evidence to the effect that the Plaintiff
had in her possession approximately $2,000.00 worth of Indian Jewelry
and that the Defendant had in his possession approximately $6,000.00
worth of Indian Jewelry and $1,700.00 cash; that the Court awarded
$2,000.00 cash to the Plaintiff in addition to the $2,000.00 she
had in order to effect an equal distribution of the Indian Jewelry
and the Defendant's cash.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN AWARDING
ALIMONY TO PLAINTIFF.
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, states
as follows:
"When a decree of divorce is made, the Court may make such
orders in relation to the children, property and parties and
the maintenance of the parties and children as may be equitable.5'
The legislature in enacting this section recognized that the
Courts have a wide latitude in the division of property so long
as such distributions are equitable in nature.
The Courts have reflected this theory for many years. The case
of Stewart vs. Stewart, Utah, 242 P.2d 947, decided in 192 6, stands
for the following proposition:
' " It is now the settled lav; and practice of this Court
that while a large discretion is vested in the trial
Courts in applying the provisions of the foregoing statute and in making the distribution of property yet
such discretion is not an arbitrary one, but is a
sound, legal discretion and is subject to review by
this Court. This Court is also firmly committed to
the doctrine that the judgments and orders of the
trial Court in awarding alimony or in making distribution of property will not be interferred with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4unless it is made to appear with at least reasonable
certainty that the discretion vested in those Courts
has been abused to the prejudice of an Appellant
in some particular or particulars."
In the case of Bader vs. Bader, 424 P.2d 150, IS U.2d 407,
the Supreme Court .in affirming then District Judge, A.H. Ellett said,
:

'It would lead to intolerable instability of judgments
if this Court should assume the prerogative and accept
the responsibility of merely second guessing a trial
Judge who has done a conscientious job of attempting
to make a just and equitable allocation of the property
and income of the parties in regards to alimony and
support money as the trial appears to have done here.
It is due to this fact, taken into consideration with
the nature of the trial judge's authority and duty
and his advantage position that in such matters he
is allowed a comparatively wide latitude of discretion which will not be disturbed in the absence of
clear abuse. A circumstance which we have found
here. Judgment affirmed."
The facts of this case indicate that the Plaintiff and the
Defendant has been married for many years; that the children of
the parties were grown and not living with the parties.

The Def-

endant earns approximately $13,000. ,00 to $19,000.00 per year
and that the Plaintiff has income of approximately $14,400.00
per year when working.
The record shows, as is conceded in Plaintiff's brief, that
the property owned by the parties was acquired during their marriage by both parties working full time. The Trial Court was spared :the questions of child custody, child support and division of
property as it might relate to or for the benefit of the children.
The sole question being before the Court was the division of
the property between the parties.
The record
reflects
the
the
Plaintiff
or
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the lack thereof. (See cross examination of Plaintiff), which the
trial Court had the opportunity to witness and take into consideration in making the division of property.

The Plaintiff would

have the Supreme Court believe that all of the Plaintiff's injuries
are attributable to harsh treatment by the Defendant. However,
the record shows that her latest injury was caused by falling
on the ice, and which was anticipated to be a temporary injury
only, as she anticipated going back to work at her chosen occupation
of a school teacher.
Plaintiff cites the case of DeRose vs. DeRose, 19 U.2d 77,426
P.2d 221, (1967).

This case is inapplicable because there were

minor children that the Court had to contend with in allocating
the property to the wife to enable her to raise the children. See
the case of Wilson vs. Wilson, 5 U.2d 79, 296 P.2d 977, where the
Court said as follows:
"It is necessary for the Court to consider in addition to
the relative guilt or innocence of the parties, an appraisal of all the attendent facts and circumstances: the duration of the marriage; the ages of the parties; their social positions and standards of living; their health;
the consideration relative to the children; the money and
property they possess and how it was acquired; the capabilities and training and their present potential incomes .f:
The Wilson case is demonstrative of the lengths the Supreme
Court has gone to uphold judgments of the Trial Court which on
their face appear to be grossly unjust to one party or the other.
The trial Court in the instant case recognized that both parties
had worked during their married life; that the property was acquired
during their marriage,
not
withstanding
fact
that certain proDigitized by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben the
Clark Law
School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~6~
perty was vested in the name of the Plaintiff alone.

The trial

Court apparently concluded, the Plaintiff!s incapacity was not as
serious as claimed by her and that she was capable of presently
of providing for herself through a teaching contract held by her
with a local school sys"cen.
The Plaintiff derived the benefit of appreciation on the home
and the reduction in the mortgage balance due, together with the
income tax deductions*

Certainly all of these benefited the Plaintiff,

y^t are unrecognized by her in her plea of poverty to this Court.
Such matters were, however, before the Trial Court and considered
by the trial Court in making the award.
See the Utah case of Allen vs. Allen 109 U. 99, 165 P.2d 872,
where the Court said,
"An Appellate Court cannot remain the Court of appeals
and invite a review of every case decided by a lower
tribunal where its judgment fails to satisfy one or
both parties to the litigation."
Numerous citations to the record could be made, however,the
Defendant represents to this Court that a fair and impartial reading
of the entire transcript and not the citation of an answer out: of
a context, nor a short colloquy between the witness and the counsel
will demonstrate that the trial Court's decision reflects the trial
Court's consideration of all the evidence submitted by the parties
and is a reasonable and fair decision*

See the case of Slaughter vs.

Slaughter, 13 U.2d 274, 421 p.2d 503.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DIDN'T ERROR IN REFUSING TO REOPEN THE
CASE TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO SUBMIT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE, THE DIVISION
OF THE PROPERTY.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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One of the most rewarding experiences in the practice of
lav; is the submission to the Court of a question on appeal. The
decision of the Court vindicating a position taken is gratifying.
However, the Court's failure to reverse an alleged error in trial
Court or the reversing of the favorable trial Court judgment is
part of our continuing legal education.

Therefore, in answer

to Point II, the Defendant's attorney submits the case of Lloyd
Lei^is, Plaintiff and Respondent vs. Lynn S. Porter, dba Lynn S.
Porter Housemovers, Inc, Defendant and Appellant, #14486, filed
November 1, 1976.
a divorce case.

It is conceded that Lewis vs. Porter was not

However, the question is the same: Which is

whether or not a trial Court can refuse to hear additional evidence not offered by the parties at the time of the trial upon
motion to reopen.

This Court said the following:

"The Defendant had ample opportunity to produce his books
and records to indicate his version of the transaction with
Plaintiff and to be present at trial. We discover no
basis to ascribe abuse or discretion to the denial of the
motion to reopen."
The only material factual difference is that Plaintiff could
cite to distinguish the cases is that Defendant was unrepresented
by counsel until a day or two before trial.

Such lack of representation

does not prevent the submission of interrogatories, request for
admissions, taking depositions, all of-which provide the Plaintiff
with a vehicle for judgment in its favor UDon the failure of the
Defendant to answer interrogatories or admissions.
As in the Lewis vs. Porter case, it would appear that all
of the evidence
now sought by the Plaintiff to be introduced was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'. -3in her possession before, during and after the trial and she s
should not now be heard to say that she did not have the ability
and opportunity to present the evidence to the Court as she knew
of the issues relating to the division of property prior to the time
of the trial *
III. THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS ItoT- MANIFESTLY UNFAIR
AND INEQUITABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THEREBY PERMITTING THIS
COURT TO GRANT RELIEF.
The Defendant in this case, certainly takes no issue with the
citations of the following cases by the Plaintiff, to-wit:
Allen vs. Allen, 65 P.2d 872, Dahlberg vs. Dahlberg 77 U.2d
157, 292 P. 214, Hendricks vs. Hendricks, 31 U 553, 63 P.2d 277,
Hansen vs. Hansen 537 P.2d 491, and Mitchell vs. Mitchell 527 P.2d
1359f for the reasons that each of these cases either announce or
reiterate the proposition that this Court will not disturb the judgment of a trial Court unless there is a clear abuse of discretion;
that the evidence preponderates against the findings or that there
was a misapplication or misunderstanding of the law resulting in
prejudicial error.
However, the Plaintiff, in paragraph 13 of her brief, introduces
to this Court evidence, not brought forth in the trial, that there
was more than $17,000.00 worth of silver and torquoise owned by the
parties.

The Plaintiff seeks to have this unsworn; unintroduced

evidence given the same credibility as the evidence introduced in
Court.

The credibility so established Plaintiff seeks to have this

Court now accept that evidence and award to Plaintiff the home of the
parties by reason
of
the W.fact
that
has BYU.
alleged, though
Digitized by
the Howard
Hunter Law
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not proven, ownership of additional Indian jewelry by the Defendant.
This argument reduced to its sixnpliest denominator is an assertion
by Plaintiff that she can create

additional evidence by stating

facts in her brief, unsupported by the record, to be given the same
weight as other evidence introduced in testimony for the purpose
of achieving a reversal by this Court.
The Plaintiff cites the case of Allen vs. Allen, 165 P.2d 872,
as authority for the proposition that where a Court arbitrarily
refuses to entertain credible evidence then the Court's findings
and decree should be vacated and set aside. However, Plaintiff's
argument fails on the premise that Plaintiff never offered nor
introduced the evidence although the evidence was available to and
in the possession of the Plaintiff at the time of trial and, therefore, the Court never refused no entertain the evidence at the
trial.
One of the latest pronouncements of this Court relative to
matters of discretion of the Court is the case of Baker vs. Baker
decided by this Court in June of 1976 and cited as 551 P.2nd 1263
(No Utah citation available at this time).
Justice Maughan in that case reinteriated the Court's oft
times statement as follows:
"In a divorce action the Court has considerable latitutde
and discretion in adjusting financial and property inerests. Plaintiff has not sustained his burden to prove
that there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the
law resulting in a substantial and prejudicial error or the
evidence clearly preponderated against the findings or
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest the
clear abuse of discretion."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-10CONCLUSIOIT
Divorce actions are unique legal actions.

Each one possessed

of its own facts, circumstances, problems, emotions and personalities.
When the romance of a marriage has gone, the parties generally
look to the security they may derive from the acquisition of the
assets of the parties and if the severing of marital relations
does not cause trauma, certainly the division of the property
through litigation will cause trauma*

Counsel may also become

emotionally involved in the predicaments of their client, losing
the detached reflection which is necessary in divorce cases*

Judges

provide the system with the stability to make an equitable division
of the property of the parties and in many instances, the criticism
of the Judges is a result of the lack of the detached reflection
by tlie party making the criticism.

There are no winners, only

losers in any divorce action.
In this case, the parties are mature people, the family raised.
each demonstrating the capacity to earn a living.

However, it

appears that the Plaintiff is presently and temporarily disabled,
but is anticipating partial or full employment.

She has the capa-

city and intellectual ability to provide for herself as does the
Defendant.
The parties have acquired all of the property they now possess.
Some of it is in Plaintiff's name alone, some is in joint tenancy,
some of it is in the Defendant's name alone.

The parties are free

from the more Digitized
difficult
issues of child custody, child support,
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11alimony to the working and non working wife who cares for minor
children and the payment of large debts which encumber future
income. The trial Court apparently viewed the Plaintiff and Defendant
as equals standing before the law, each with an ability to support
themselves and taking into consideration, the Plaintiff's present
predicament of an injury resulting from a self-afflicted fall on
the ice.
Women have for years sought equality in Court. The constitution of the State of Utah demands equality between the sexes, as
does the Federal Constitution.

Various legislation including the

Equal Rights Amendment has sought to demand this equality.

The

Judge in making the division of the property apparently recognized
the equality in the sexes and attempted to effectuate an equal
division of the property based upon the facts and information
he had before him.

To this the Plaintiff bitterly comnlains, stating

that she has been treated unfairly; that the alimony is too low;
that she cannot exist; that the home must be divided upon her remarriage.

If the Court were to grant Defendant's property to

Plaintiff and Plaintifffs property to Defendant, the Plaintiff
would again allege the inequality of the Judgment.
The Plaintiff desires an award of the entire equity in the
home being approximately $48,000.00; $600.00 a month alimony,
which would be $7,200.00 per year alimony, leaving the Defendant
v/ith a job for a few years teaching school, $3,000 worth of Indian
jewelry, 1/2 of the cash derived from the sale of the motor home
and personal effects.
This, then is the Plaintiff's understanding
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12facts introduced in evidence, logic, reason, and equity. The
Plaintiff seeks to become a sweepstakes winner in an action where
there are only losers and no winners.
Members of the Court, the Defendant submits to you the entire
transcript in this case and asks only that this Court measure
the facts against the yardstick of prior decisions, untaunted
by the emotionalism of the parties and their lack of perception
because of their personal association with the litigation.
Respectfully submitted this

7

day of November, 1976.

•Lll
^^j^^ua^L^uf^
ton
•George Wy Preston
Attorney/ for Defendant and Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing brief to the Plaintiff and Appellant's Attorney, Lyle W.
Hillyard, 17 5 East 1st North, Logaiy-^tah
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